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Ms. Litan: I have to ask one question of my own. Everyone made some
convincing arguments, but I am having a really difficult time reconciling
the Visa and the Sue Webb credit card view and the networks with the
retailer view. I know that the purpose of this conference is to try to figure
it out, but what I heard from John Gove, for example, is that what 
happened in Australia ended as merchants stopped paying for loyalty 
programs. That is what I have heard in talking informally with some of the
retailers here. Why should some merchants that live on very thin margins
have to subsidize my frequent flier program?  
And I understand what the credit card companies are saying in that there
is tremendous innovation, and I see that as a consumer. But maybe Wal-
Mart doesn’t want to pay for that innovation; maybe they would rather
have lower prices. So I am not exactly clear on the directness between the
beneficiaries on the two sides. It’s this balancing act.
Mr. Sheedy: The data I’ve seen from Australia suggests that, while there
has been a reduction in interchange, there hasn’t been a change in prices
from those same merchants to consumers. One aspect of the regulatory
action has been that the merchants have been benefited. We are curious
about that because we saw a similar dynamic in the United States as we
dramatically lowered debit interchange rates. There was certainly an
attempt to sort of rejigger that market, changing honor-all-card rules, but
ultimately the merchants saw a reduction in their interchange expense, or
their merchant discount, and the consumer didn’t benefit. 
Again, as we look at Australia and as we look at some of the changes that
have happened in the United States, I think you have to resist the urge to
boil this down to very simple terms. It is natural that merchants want to
lower their costs and improve their profit margins. I just don’t see why that




 Mr. Gove: There are a couple things to which I’d like to respond. First,
we’ve heard a few people talk about the increased spend on credit cards being
a benefit for merchants, but you can’t keep increasing and increasing and
increasing. In effect, a client that we were talking to a little while back said
that they kept getting requests for more investment in the various projects to
be run. I went back through all the requests and found that they would have
234 percent market share if all these projects had been done.
It is the same with increased spend on credit cards. People can’t keep
increasing and increasing and increasing their spend. They have finite
amount of money to spend.
In terms of the impact on the merchants, I would like to give a couple
of examples of how important it is. For a number of merchants, and our
clients that we have spoken to, in terms of operating costs, it comes in at
about number two, three, or four—typically around number three. After
salaries and distribution costs, their merchant fees are the third highest
operating cost they have. It is a huge drain on merchants.
Perhaps a more specific example is some work we are doing with the oil
industry in the United Kingdom at the moment, where the merchants 
service fee takes 75 percent of the oil company’s gross margin. Now, I am
talking gross margin before they distribute the fuel or anything else. There
are some issues there for sectors. But it is very hard to get any relief on
those things.
Finally, in response to your specific question, we believe—and there is no
direct data on this—those reductions in interchange fees have been passed
through basically on a one-on-one basis to merchants, and we believe mer-
chants are passing those through to consumers. The retail industry in
Australia is the most competitive industry. It has the smallest margins of
any industry. Competition will ensure that those savings the merchants are
making are passed on to consumers.
Ms. Hanna: This is for Bill Sheedy. On August 1, 2003, the same day
that signature debit rates were mandated to go down via the settlement,
several categories of credit card rates went up. Then again there were rate
increases in October and rate changes again in February 2004. Then
again in April of this year, there were rate increases, some of which were
an equivalent of 50 basis points. How do you explain that, compared
with your statement in your presentation that your rates have gone up
only 8.6 percent?
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 Mr. Sheedy: There has been quite a bit of change in interchange in the
U.S. market. Chart 4, which I presented earlier, shows costs on an inter-
change level less the cost from a merchant discount level can be misleading
because there were a lot things happening inside that number.
Debit rates weren’t regulated to go down a third in August. It was just
part of a settlement. In the Wal-Mart settlement discussion, the 
interchange rates and acceptance decisions were sort of bundled—debit
and credit in the United States. As a part of that settlement, we agreed to
break up the acceptance between debit and credit. Say you had a bundled
package of Visa in the United States, and, just for simplicity, say that was
170 basis points of interchange and debit dropped down to 118 basis
points. I think economics would suggest that if the merchant community
was paying 170 basis points for the package and a portion of that package
dropped down to 118 basis points, the other piece would go up. I would
like to point out that we were inclined to let the market settle on that
point, but MasterCard moved and we had no choice but to respond, given
that we were about to engage in some longer term partnership discussions
with some of the issuers and we were concerned that would put us at a
competitive disadvantage.
There was another legal action, in which the Department of Justice
(DOJ) decided that they ought to litigate against our rule prohibiting Visa
members from issuing American Express and Discover cards. From the
outset of this litigation, we told the DOJ that one of the early outcomes
that would inevitably come from the litigation is that American Express
would show up on the doorstep of each one of their major banks, offering
an opportunity for them to issue American Express cards and pull in more
revenue from the merchants. We knew that was going to happen, and that
is exactly what happened.
We implemented a strategy that promoted Visa Signature and increased
the level of benefits to merchants and consumers. We developed some very
innovative marketing programs to merchants. And, yes, we increased rates,
but we hit a price point that is still dramatically lower than American
Express. I wasn’t wild about the DOJ case. I wasn’t wild about eliminating
that rule, because we knew rates were going to go up, but we had to
respond to that environment.
Mr. Schnell: I want to follow up on the question Kathy Hanna just
asked about Charts 3 and 4 where you talk about the relative stability of
CHAIR: AVIVAH LITAN 193interchange rates over time and the tendency of merchants and trial
lawyers like myself to misrepresent that. I am curious as to why there is no
reference to the PIN debit fees on these charts, which we know have gone
up thousands of percent over the last few years?
Mr. Sheedy: First off, Gordon, as you know, there are no PIN debit card
networks in the United States that are Visa-branded. My role primarily
focused on the Visa U.S.A. market. Those data points were shown as being
Visa numbers, and they are reflective of Visa data. 
While Interlink has been a second-tier player in the PIN debit market,
the PIN debit market interchange rates have moved up gradually over
time. There are a whole host of reasons why that has occurred, but the rea-
son why the chart doesn’t show Interlink or PIN debit is because there are
no Visa-branded PIN debit markets in the United States.
Mr. D’Agostino: The economists who spoke earlier this morning had a
hard time drawing conclusions from the data they were presented on where
they think this is all going in the United States. I’d be interested in the per-
spectives of the various members of this panel on where they think inter-
change and the developments around that market are going to go in the
United States.
Ms. Webb: We think that interchange is going to go up in some places
and down in other places, quite frankly. This is an increasingly competitive
market with more and more players. Some will be driving interchange up,
and some will be driving interchange down. We think it will be very
dynamic over time, and we think it also does have some natural caps to it,
because we are competing against various others and an increasing array of
other mechanisms that keep it naturally capped to remain competitive.
Mr. Sheedy: I would like to weigh in. I absolutely agree with Sue. I do
think, given the diverse pressures we are seeing and, quite frankly, the
opportunities we are seeing, rates will go up in certain places and down in
others. When you look in the U.S. market, nearly 60 percent of consumer
expenditures are still nonelectronic. Most of the time we spend at Visa in
developing product and in looking at marketing opportunities is on how
to penetrate those market segments that are not yet accepting cards. And I
see us doing that with lower price points and lower interchange. 
We have a dynamic in the U.S. market. I think Gordon was referring to
the fact there is this disparity between on-line PIN-based and signature-
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 based debit interchange rates. With all due respect to Stu Weiner, his data
showing that the debit rates on the Visa system are going up is incorrect.
In fact, we have lowered debit rates in recent weeks. Looking forward, I see
offline debit rates going down. I see on-line debit rates coming up because
it makes sense there would be a closer convergence of these two rates. It
seems logical, and I think that is where the market will set it.
Ms. Litan: I don’t understand what is logical about a convergence
between PIN and signature debit.
Mr. Sheedy: I’d be happy to respond to that. It speaks to how these products
evolved. PIN debit, to Lloyd Constantine’s point, has been around for quite
some time. It came on the backs of the ATM networks that were looking to
increase the amount of activity over their networks. They marginally priced or
reverse-priced the product down to merchants to incent them to deploy PIN
pads, and they were not very successful in doing that in the late 1980s and early
1990s. Their success came when the Visa system invested in offline debit and
heavily promoted the check card. The merchants responded by deploying PIN
pads and processing more of those transactions through the regional debit net-
works that had priced their product, at that point based on marginal process-
ing costs, which, I think the economists would concur, is not a sustainable
model. 
So what you had was the same consumer walking in, very often the same
plastic, PIN heavily subsidized at a not-sustainable rate, and the signature sub-
sidized at a higher rate. It makes sense if the interchange structure needs to
appear to be logical and rational, there needs to be a sort of convergence of
these two rates, because you do have the same consumer and a similar process
hitting the same checking account.
Ms. Litan: I want to add one question to bring in our European participants.
It looks like we have had the exact opposite phenomenon in both Spain and the
Netherlands, where the PIN debit and the debit have dropped as far as they can
possibly go. What is so different about the U.S. market and your markets? Is it
the regulators? What is it?
Mr. Gabeiras: Day and night. I don’t know if the day is the United
States and night is Europe, or reversely.
There are many differences. First, interchange rates in Europe are declin-
ing, truly, or bearing a steady position market by market. Meanwhile, they
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different systems of setting domestic interchange rates, plus the cross-bor-
der European system. There is not a similar situation in the U.S. market.
Third, in the United States, there is no regulator fixing the value of the
interchange rate. At most, the official dependence in charge of competition
challenges you before the court. In Europe such a thing doesn’t happen.
The regulator determines the rate, and you have to appeal the decision
before the justice system if you want to modify it. The markets are quite
different, to my perception. Additionally, one of the things that is happen-
ing in Europe is that there is a biased situation between the huge political
market power of retailers’ organizations and practically no political market
power on the cardholders’ side. In my opinion, this is also contributing in
some way to the current situation. Look at the participants to this confer-
ence. No cardholders or consumer representatives are present. There is no
cardholder perspective. There is no consumer organization defending card-
holders’ interest in this conference. And that is what is also happening in
Europe today.
Ms. Litan: It is assumed that the issuers and Visa protect consumer
interests here.
Mr. Gabeiras: We protect the cardholders, but nobody believes it.
Mr. Haasdijk: I would like to add to that with regard to the
Netherlands. As I said, we are no longer the acquirer, the banks are. And
the banks—together with the NMa, the anticompetition authority—have
been striving to get an agreed-upon interchange fee, which, as far as I
know, and I am not fully versed, should be based on the lowest cost of each
of the participating banks with regard to the authorization. But, as far as I
know, no agreement has yet been reached. The only thing I know is that
whenever you look at discussions like this, you have to find the balance
between a concentration and cooperation on the one hand and competi-
tion on the other hand. What you see happening now in the
Netherlands—albeit at a much lower pricing scale compared with what I
hear about from this audience—is, by the end of the day, the competition
is there and the prices have gone up. That is something to be pitied.
Ms. Litan: That is a different view. Let’s hear quickly from Xavier Durieu.
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 Mr. Durieu: I am glad the consumer was mentioned, because the con-
sumer is our concern. We have in Europe more than a billion calls a day
from consumers, so I am happy to speak about them. 
Today’s system is expensive—extremely expensive—for consumers. The
reason is that no one knows how much the retailer, and therefore the con-
sumer, has to pay for the transactions because of the interchange fee. There
is no allocation of the cost. We have spoken all day about the interchange
fee as a solid item, the pricing for different services, and these services are
to the benefit of the consumers mostly, but also to banks, though not paid
for by the banks. I would like to stress the idea that in Europe, 50 percent
of the cross-border interchange fee is for fraud and unpaid balances to 
so-called payment guarantee. If you think of that, who has an interest in
the issuing banks reducing the cost of those two elements? No one. The
retailer will pay at the end of the day. He has no choice but to pay. There
is no incentive to reduce that cost. That is why we need the public author-
ities to ask everyone to pay for his benefits. And one should think twice
before asking the retailer to pay. 
Take the unpaid balance of cardholders. Who is establishing the scoring
of whom will receive a plastic card? Is it the retailer? He still pays for
unpaid balances. Who decides on the technology of a card, which will
eventually, possibly, generate fraud? Who decides on that? Is it the retailer?
Still, he pays for the fraud. I am truly surprised the U.S. network imposed
taking the EMV standards on European retailers to move to PIN-based
transactions to reduce fraud, while—if I have understood well today—the
opposite tendency in the United States is to promote signature-based trans-
actions. I believe the answer to that is the level of the interchange fee.
Ms. DeVries: I want to speak on the merchant’s ability to negotiate pric-
ing and impact consumer choice as to what payment mechanism they are
going to use at the point of sale. To Sue’s comment that we should be offer-
ing a private-label card, that puts me smack-dab in the middle of having to
offer rewards that are more compelling than the miles and the cash-back
bonuses that already exist. So what possible cost savings could there be for
a merchant to have to compete on the rewards base?
Ms. Webb: I’ll respond to that because if I said private label, I misspoke.
I certainly meant to say a co-brand card. A co-brand card actually does pres-
ent considerable benefits to merchants that issue them. One is that when
that card is used in your establishment, it often is at an extraordinarily 
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as a vehicle to offer rewards to those customers, which bring them back into
your establishment. Even when they shop somewhere else, it counts for
rewards for your establishment, and that brings them back in to buy more
from you. So we see co-brands as something incredibly effective for our
merchants that use them. As I mentioned earlier, Starbucks is just one
example. The more creative they are, the more valuable they’ll be.
Ms. DeVries: The other point is our ability to negotiate. As referenced
this morning, Walgreens very publicly told American Express to take a
hike, because their fees were too high. The reason behind that is we could
not give Visa and MasterCard a reason to raise rates any higher. I mean,
that is just simple economics of looking at the Supreme Court decision and
the impact. Now, this leads perfectly into the consumer point of view,
which is, “I’m furious with Walgreens. How dare they tell me how I am
going to pay for merchandise in their stores!”
That payment—and we are missing the consumer perspective—is a very
personal, private choice. It isn’t the business of the merchant to interfere in
that choice. That is the message we heard loud and clear.
Mr. Sheedy: I understand that challenge, because there is a lot of inertia
with the consumer. They are used to using their cards a certain way, and
for you to change that at the front end has to be a difficult discussion for
you to have with the retail ops folks. That being said, the merchant folks
in the room are probably tired of me and other Visa staff coming in and
trying to find ways to negotiate lower interchange for increased volume.
We are out there. There is a responsibility on the part of the merchants to
take steps to manage down their costs. We are willing to be a part of that
solution. The difficulty is when they provide the same level of access and
the same functionality to the competition, unwilling to differentiate. That
changes the competitive dynamic in a way that ultimately does disadvan-
tage you. But then I ask, “Where is interchange going?” It is difficult to say,
but I am hopeful that the merchant community will partner up and do
things to steer payments toward lower cost alternative forms of payment. I
can sell all day long to our board more volume at lower rates.
Ms. Webb: I agree.
Mr. Balto: I like the idea that an interchange fee is an equilibrating mech-
anism. That gives the impression that there are two sides who actually have
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 a voice in things. So when was the last time that Visa reduced its credit card
interchange fee, and why did you reduce it?
Mr. Sheedy: When was the last time credit card interchange rates were
reduced? I was wondering when we would hear from the second group of
attorneys who are suing us. David, honestly, as I sit here, I don’t know when
interchange rates on a systemwide basis were lowered for credit. I can guar-
antee you that sometime over the last 12 months there was a small-ticket
interchange fee program and an emerging-market interchange fee program
that introduced dramatically lower interchange rates on credit in order to
expand acceptance into new and emerging markets. So, did it lower the
interchange rate on the product in total? No, but there absolutely were rate
reductions granted to the entire system in these new and emerging markets.
Now, on a customized basis with individual merchants, we have lowered
rates in the last three months with merchants who were willing to work with
us in order to shift share and grow volume.
Mr. Roylance: Bill, you’ve given us a number of examples of the extremely
high value of your product and the extraordinary attractiveness of that 
product to all the parties in the payments system. Given that your product is
so fantastic and everybody wants it so much, I wonder why your organization
specializes in drafting and implementing draconian anticompetitive rules? I’ll
give you four examples on which you can comment.
The first one is called the “nondiscrimination rule,” which prevents 
merchants from surcharging or otherwise pricing to their customers in a way
that reflects the forms of payment at their will. Given that consumers are
going to want to use your card so much, it will have no impact on your 
business at all. I think you should repeal that rule immediately.
The second rule that you have is what we call the “honor-all-products rule.”
There are two parts of your honor-all-cards rule, one is an honor-all-issuers
rule, which merchants support. The other is an honor-all-products rule,
which merchants do not support because it forces them to accept all of your
products, regardless of the price. With Visa’s Signature, for example, your 
merchants don’t have the option to refuse to accept Visa Signature if they don’t
think it benefits them. They don’t have the option to refuse to accept the Visa
purchasing card, if they don’t think it benefits them. They just have to pay
your higher prices, which you have imposed without giving them a choice.
The third example is the “no-bypass rule.” You are trying to prevent First
Data from putting transactions through the network, trying to force them to
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want any network competition. If your network was that great, you would-
n’t mind because the people would voluntarily choose to use your network.
And the fourth example is your recent rule change which prevents Susan
Webb from authorizing the cards that she has issued that she receives from
her own merchants as “on-us transactions.” You are now forcing her to put
them through your network instead of processing them herself.
I find all those rules to be anticompetitive. If your product and your system
are that strong and you really believe in it, I wonder why you continually imple-
ment, introduce, and enforce those kinds of rules. I would be very interested to
hear your views.
Mr. Sheedy: Stu, how much time do we have left in this session?
Am I bleeding?  
Ms. Duncan: Finally, I suppose there is the fifth rule, which is the rule
that prevents us from knowing what the rules are.
We only find out about them when we’ve violated them, supposedly, and
then someone comes out and explains them. So I would really like an
explanation for that one as well.
Mr. Sheedy: For those of you who have seen Visa’s operating regula-
tions book, it is about the size of the New York telephone book. Help me
understand which rules in particular you think aren’t well understood in
the marketplace.
Ms. Duncan: The discounting rules, for example. Supposedly, you can
discount for cash. In fact, there are so many hurdles put in the way of dis-
counting for cash that, as a practical matter, you can’t do it.
Mr. Sheedy:That is helpful just so I can focus my response. Let me start with
the processing piece first, to Robert Roylance, and I don’t mean to bundle these
things to obfuscate. I think the on-us issue and the mandatory routing issue I
can hit with one response: Because ultimately it is the position of Visa—
endorsed by our board—that you cannot separate increasingly the processing of
Visa transactions from the product. The functionality that resides within
VisaNet, that drives value to merchants and to consumers, is absolutely critical
to the product delivery. Increasingly, we will be driving rewards-based programs
off VisaNet that require us to see that transaction and increase the level of value
that we drive to consumers and to merchants. So the decision to require trans-
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 actions to be routed over the network and to require Sue Webb and JPMorgan
Chase to route even their on-us transactions over the network provides a better
environment, we believe. 
The larger percentage of the board is represented by the acquiring communi-
ty in the United States. They endorsed that plan to provide for 100 percent of
the transactions being routed over a network so that we can increase the oppor-
tunities for us to innovate in the processing systems to drive more value through
the products.
Honor-all-products. We have two honor-all-card rules in the United States,
which provide for merchants to make a separate decision as to whether or not
they want to accept Visa debit or Visa credit. Visa credit encompasses all forms
of Visa credit, be it commercial or consumer. There is a reason why, from the
outset of the association (and I am sure you can appreciate this), honor-all-cards
exists, either at a product level or at the member level: consistency of experience
for the consumer. Ubiquity of acceptance was an important tenet of the card-
holder experience. If the consumer doesn’t know whether or not the card is
going to be honored when they walk through the merchant’s door, that isn’t
good for business. Ultimately it is bad for merchants because consumers will be
hesitant and maybe won’t shop there because they don’t know whether or not
their cards will work. 
So, I understand the need and the desire for merchants to have greater
levels for choice, and we’ve done that in the United States with debit ver-
sus credit. I think you made some reference to whether merchants have a
choice. They do. Merchants have plenty of choices. They can steer. They
can discount. I think the discounting rules, as they relate to cash, are
absolutely well understood. And if they are not, then we’ll do a better job
of communicating that.
To Sue’s point, discounting rules were well understood in the United States
because it was a common business practice in the fuel environment. If it was
so confusing to the merchant community, I am curious as to why it was such
a common practice in the fuel business in the 1980s and early 1990s.
Did I hit all your points, Robert?  You may not be satisfied with my
response, certainly. 
Mr. Roylance: Well, just now you implied that merchants have a choice
on accepting credit or debit, because you were giving them that choice. But
my understanding is it took eight years in the courts to force you to give
them that choice. Is that correct?
Mr. Sheedy: Yes.
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Mr. Roylance: Why were you forced into it? Why didn’t you just give it
to them? Why did you fight against it?
Mr. Sheedy: Because it gets back to why those rules existed in the first
place. Making sure that a merchant accepted all credit products from all
issuers in the United States was important to ensure that the consumer had
a consistent experience at the point of transaction. If a merchant decided
to accept cards from Sue but not accept cards from Bank of America, that
is a problem. That creates inconsistency and confuses the customer. 
Ms. Litan: I have to interrupt here because we are running out of time.
Let’s just take a few more questions. I am sure Bill will be available after-
ward to answer additional questions.
Mr. Sheedy: I absolutely would be happy to talk afterward as long as you like.
Mr. Frisch: Bill, I am going to give you a break. This is a question for
John Grove. You said in your comments you felt comfortable that the mer-
chants were passing along the savings from lower interchange on to the
customers. Do you have any empirical data to support that or is that just
anecdotal evidence that you are hearing?
Mr. Gove: At this stage, it is just anecdotal evidence. Philip Lowe may
have some other, more detailed evidence. One of the issues is that a lot of
the retail price variations without any pass-on of the reductions could out-
weigh that. People are trying to collect that data at the moment, but to my
understanding, there is nothing published.
Mr. Frisch: Can you comment on that, Philip?
Mr. Lowe: It is very hard to measure that effect, because we estimate that
when it is fully passed through, it would reduce the Consumer Price Index
(CPI) by about 0.2 of 1 percent. That sounds like a small effect, but it is
worth $500 million to consumers. It is just hard to measure when the CPI
is going up at roughly 2.5 percent a year.
I think there is another point that gets missed here, though. Even if the
retail sector was a monopolist—there was only one retailer selling all
goods—and it faced lower costs, it would pass through some of those lower
costs into lower prices. Even a monopolist would do that. The Australian
retail sector is not monopolistic; it is extremely competitive.CHAIR: AVIVAH LITAN 203
If you believe in competition, which I think is a reasonable representa-
tion of the Australian retail market, these lower costs will flow through into
lower prices. And I think this is then good for consumers. It may not be
good for the guys who use their Visa card because they are getting fewer
rewards now, but that was the intention. There are a lot of other guys out
there who don’t use a Visa or MasterCard. They use cash or debit and they
are much better off for it. To say that the reforms are not pro-consumer is
missing the fact that not everyone uses a Visa or a MasterCard.
Mr. Gove: I think that is an important point. The issue is, and we said
it earlier in a number of the presentations, that cash payers are subsidizing
card payers and not just when these reductions of interchange happen and
the merchant service fees or the discount rates reduce. The reduction does
not flow back to cardholders only; it flows back to all consumers, so the
amount is much smaller.
Mr. Sheedy: Can I respond to that from a U.S. perspective? We’ve heard
that point of view from a number of economists who talk about cash users
subsidizing credit card users. Irrespective of the sort of back-end costs and
value benefits between cash and card usage, at least in our market, there
aren’t hordes of cash users. There are certain consumers that use cash in
certain instances, but the only cash customers that we are aware of are the
unbanked. In the end, the unbanked are going to be better served by 
revenue streams that go into the checking account that make checking
account costs more affordable for a broader segment of the consumer. I
think ultimately that allows for electronification of commerce across the
economy as a benefit for all. There aren’t consumers, at least in the United
States, who use just cash.
Ms. Litan: I am not an economist, and I don’t want to have opinions
because I am not an economist, but it seems like the benefits and the costs
should be directly attributed. We are speaking about so many indirect 
benefits and costs to consumers. I don’t think it is up to us to determine
that. It is up to the consumers to determine that, the merchants to deter-
mine their pricing, and card issuers to determine their pricing. It is when
other people start making decisions on behalf of other parties that it makes
me a little uncomfortable. But I’m not an economist.
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Mr. Bouchard: I am going to add on to what was just said about low-
ering prices. If you want to look at where we are lowering prices, go to a
Wal-Mart store. Bill, I guess you haven’t been to one. You probably spend
all your time in San Francisco boutiques.
Mr. Sheedy: I was in a Wal-Mart in rural Alabama just last week.
Ms. Litan: What, you were selling Visa cards?
Mr. Sheedy: I was in a NASCAR van.
Mr. Bouchard: I think you know about Wal-Mart looking for any
opportunity to drive efficiencies and lower costs and pass that along to the
consumer. So this would be another item on which we could lower our
costs and pass along the savings to the consumer. Your suggestion that you
haven’t seen any reductions in prices at merchants, I think, is offensive,
particularly to us. That is our business. I think everybody knows that is our
business. I suggest that if Visa adopted the same strategy, we probably
wouldn’t be having this conference to discuss interchange.
Mr. Sheedy: The only thing I’ll say to that is there were a number of
merchants immediately following the settlement of the honor-all-cards 
litigation (I’m not calling it the Wal-Mart case) that talked to Wall Street
analysts and said, “No, no, no. We are going to drop that right to our 
bottom line. Our shareholders are going to benefit.”  
I think it is interesting that in certain environments, depending upon the
audience, it either falls to the bottom line or it falls to the consumer. I don’t
think that is the point. There has been a lot of discussion today about the costs
of the service from the banks’ and from the networks’ perspective and whether
or not the fees being provided are appropriate given those costs. What I would
suggest is that in certain instances, looking at it in the historical model, we are
below cost, and in certain instances, we are above cost.
But the payments system and interchange are ultimately determined
based on the value to the various constituencies, and that is what is 
driving the payments system and interchange value. I understand there is
one value proposition from a Wal-Mart perspective. There is a different
value proposition from the JPMorgan Chase perspective. I think it is dif-
ficult, when you are looking at one side of the equation or the other, to
understand exactly how that gets balanced. We can mock the balanced
idea, but in the end, it is how we approach the business.
 